Global Fertilizer Supply Chain Disruptions during a Hypothetical Iran Conflict and Their Agricultural Impacts: A Scenario Analysis
Abstract
The global fertilizer industry sustains more than eight billion people and represents one of the most geopolitically sensitive commodity systems on Earth. This comprehensive review systematically examines fertilizer production, consumption, import dependence, and trade dynamics across the United States of America, Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, and India – four geopolitically and agriculturally critical actors representing diverse positions on the fertilizer supply-demand spectrum. Against this backdrop, the paper analyses the potential cascading impacts of a hypothetical Iran-United States-Israel military conflict, which if it were to occur, would fundamentally disrupt Strait of Hormuz transit, elevate global urea prices by an estimated 19–28%, increase insurance premiums by over 50%, and reduce tanker traffic through the strait by approximately 75%. Drawing upon recent data from the International Fertilizer Association (IFA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Bank, S&P Global Platts, and peer-reviewed agronomic literature, the study quantifies production capacity, consumption intensity, import vulnerability, and price transmission mechanisms for each examined country or region. The review further evaluates the historical precedent of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict's fertilizer disruption, develops a multi-dimensional crisis-impact framework, and proposes evidence-based policy recommendations encompassing strategic reserves, supply diversification, biological input integration, and regional cooperation agreements. The findings reveal that India would face the most acute vulnerability among reviewed nations, with annual fertilizer import expenditure exceeding USD 12 billion and strategic reserve margins of less than 45 days. Gulf nations would simultaneously face market dislocation despite being major exporters, while the United States would confront price shock transmission affecting domestic agricultural competitiveness. The paper concludes that such a conflict would represent a structural stress test exposing systemic fragilities in global fertilizer architecture and would catalyse urgently needed diversification of supply chains, input substitution technologies, and international governance frameworks.
Keywords
Nitrogen fertilizer
Strait of Hormuz disruption
Iran conflict scenario
Food security geopolitics
India fertilizer import
Biofertilizer
Strategic fertilizer reserves.
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Introduction
The global fertilizer industry constitutes one of the most critical yet chronically underappreciated pillars of modern civilisation. Without the sustained application of nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K) fertilizers, contemporary agricultural systems could support at most half the current global population at prevailing dietary standards. Since Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch demonstrated industrial ammonia synthesis in 1909, synthetic fertilizers have enabled a roughly fourfold expansion of agricultural productivity per unit land area, fundamentally altering the relationship between population growth and food production capacity. Today, approximately 190 million metric tonnes (Mt) of fertilizer nutrients are applied globally each year, sustaining crop yields that feed roughly 4.1 billion people who could not otherwise be fed from available arable land under organic management regimes alone (IFA, 2025; Smil, 2004).
Yet this extraordinary productive achievement rests upon a supply chain architecture characterised by stark geographic concentration, substantial energy intensity, and deep sensitivity to geopolitical disruption. Nitrogen fertilizers – which comprise approximately 59% of total nutrient consumption – are synthesised primarily from ammonia produced via the Haber-Bosch process, which requires natural gas as both feedstock and energy source. Phosphate fertilizers derive from mined phosphate rock, concentrated in Morocco (which holds approximately 70% of identified global reserves), China, and a small number of other producing nations. Potash originates almost exclusively from Canada (Saskatchewan), Belarus, and Russia, with these three sources historically supplying over 70% of global muriate of potash (MOP) exports. This triple concentration in nitrogen energy sourcing, phosphate geology, and potash geography means that agricultural systems worldwide are perpetually vulnerable to supply shocks emanating from geopolitical developments far removed from the fields they ultimately serve.
A hypothetical full-scale military conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran would dramatically crystallise this vulnerability. The Strait of Hormuz – through which approximately 30% of globally traded fertilizers pass, alongside 20% of world LNG trade essential for nitrogen fertilizer production – would become the epicentre of naval blockade, shipping insurance crisis, and route diversion. Within weeks of such a conflict, Middle Eastern granular urea would likely rise 19%, Egyptian urea 28%, DAP prices would surge, and freight rates for vessels transiting alternative routes would increase 35–45%. Nations heavily dependent on fertilizer imports would face immediate threats to their imminent planting seasons, with cascading risks to food availability, rural incomes, and national food security extending through the affected growing seasons and potentially beyond.
Against this backdrop, the present review pursues four interconnected objectives. First, it establishes a rigorous baseline of fertilizer production, consumption, and trade data for the United States, Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, and India – four actors selected for their significance in the global fertilizer system and their differential positioning as major producers, major consumers, or both. Second, it analyses the potential mechanisms through which such a conflict would transmit economic and physical disruption through the fertilizer supply chain to agricultural systems globally. Third, it examines historical analogues – particularly the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict – to contextualise potential disruptions within a broader pattern of fertilizer market fragility. Fourth, it proposes actionable policy frameworks for enhancing agricultural resilience through supply diversification, strategic reserve development, and accelerated adoption of alternative biological inputs.
Conclusion
This comprehensive review has examined global fertilizer production, consumption, trade, and import dependence across the United States, Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council nations, and India, before systematically analysing the potential impacts of a hypothetical Iran-U.S.-Israel conflict on the global fertilizer system. The evidence establishes that global fertilizer supply chains are structurally fragile, geographically concentrated, and poorly protected against the recurring disruptions that characterise an era of elevated geopolitical tension.
Under such a scenario, the United States, as both a significant fertilizer producer and a potential military participant, would face paradoxical domestic agricultural costs including urea price increases of approximately 33% and elevated production costs that would threaten farm profitability in the approaching planting season. Israel, through ICL's Dead Sea potash operations, occupies a globally significant production position whose operational continuity during conflict would provide some price stability in potash markets even as logistics costs rise. GCC nations – whose combined urea production capacity of approximately 14.5 Mt represents approximately 8–10% of global supply and 30% of globally traded volumes – would experience production continuity disruption through a Strait of Hormuz shipping crisis, with Qatar alone potentially losing approximately 60–70% of export capacity within the first month. India, with import dependence exceeding 90% for potash, 55–60% for DAP, and 23% for urea, facing strategic reserves measured in weeks rather than months, and with over 600 million agricultural livelihoods at stake, would confront the most severe and immediate crisis of all reviewed entities.
The policy framework needed to address this vulnerability is multi-dimensional: strategic reserve systems providing 90–120 days of consumption security; supply chain diversification reducing dependence on any single geographic chokepoint; NUE improvement programmes reducing absolute consumption requirements; biological input transition roadmaps progressively reducing synthetic fertilizer dependency; and international governance architecture capable of coordinating emergency response across the fragmented global fertilizer trading system. None of these measures is individually sufficient; collectively implemented, they offer a credible path toward a more resilient global fertilizer system capable of sustaining food security through the geopolitical uncertainties of the coming decades.
A hypothetical Gulf crisis would ultimately pass through conflict resolution, route adaptation, or demand response – as the 2022 crisis did. But the underlying structural vulnerabilities it would expose would persist until deliberately and systematically addressed. The most important legacy of such a scenario would be the political will to invest in that structural transformation before the next disruption occurs. Along with supply-side measures, strengthening agricultural extension services is equally important. Farmers need proper guidance on efficient fertilizer use and pest management practices. Combining nutrient management with pest control can help in reducing risk and improving sustainability.
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